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1 
INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS 
TO COMBAT CHILD SEX TOURISM: 
EVALUATING THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
CONVENTION ON COMMERCIAL CHILD 
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 
Kalen Fredette* 
Abstract: This paper assesses the recent national and multinational ef-
forts to combat global child sex tourism (CST), focusing particularly on 
the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Protection of Children 
Against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. Ultimately, the rise in CST of-
fenses compared to the sparse number of CST convictions strongly sug-
gests the inadequacy of the national and multinational efforts currently 
in play. However, even a significant increase in convictions by “Sending 
States” (the focus of most legislation, including the COE Convention) is 
unlikely to sufficiently diminish CST unless matched by heightened en-
forcement efforts in “Destination States.” Properly addressing CST re-
quires comprehensive legislation at the national and international level 
that stimulates multinational cooperation and motivates Destination 
States to prosecute offenders and foster local initiatives for victim pre-
vention, protection and assistance. 
Introduction 
 In many developing countries, destitute children are routinely 
sexually exploited by foreign visitors.Child sex tourism (CST) is a 
global humanitarian crisis, both in terms of scale and its devastating 
impact on victims and their communities. Due to the inherently clan-
destine nature of the activity, estimates of the number of offenses are 
uncertain.1 The recent estimate by the U.S. State Department—that 
                                                                                                                      
* M.A., University of Virginia; J.D., University of Texas at Austin; LLM in International 
Law, University of Edinburgh. 
1 Sara Austin, Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children: How Extra-Territorial Legislation 
Can Help, in Violence Against Women: From Silence to Empowerment 39 (Don Brandt 
ed., 2003); Jeremy Seabrook, No Hiding Place: Child Sex Tourism and the Role of 
Extraterritorial Legislation, at ix (2000); Naomi L. Svensson, Extraterritorial Account-
ability: An Assessment of the Effectiveness of Child Sex Tourism Laws, 28 Loyola Int’l Comp. L. 
Rev. 641, 643–44 (2006). 
2 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 32:1 
each year, more than two million children fall victim to commercial 
sexual exploitation—provides a sobering indication of the problem’s 
magnitude.2 The number of CST perpetrators is also uncertain be-
cause few are held accountable, but the statistical indicators available 
are troubling.3 For example, among the roughly five million tourists 
who visit Thailand annually, perhaps two-thirds are sex tourists, ten 
percent of whom purportedly engage in sex with minors.4 Statistical 
inexactitude aside, CST is clearly widespread and rapidly growing.5 
Almost every state is affected and the problem will only grow worse as 
perpetrators popularize new regions.6 
                                                                                                                      
2 See Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
Trafficking in Persons Report 24 (2008), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/105501.pdf [hereinafter 2008 TIP Report]; Heather C. Giordanella, Status of 
§ 2423(b): Prosecuting United States Nationals for Sexually Exploiting Children in Foreign Coun-
tries, 12 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 133, 134 (1998); Cynthia Price Cohen, Child Sexual Exploi-
tation in Developing Countries, 44 Rev. Int’l Comm’n of Jurists 42, 42 (1990). But see 
Reuters Health, Child Prostitution a Global Problem, Apr. 19, 2002, http://www. 
thebody.com/content/whatis/art22944.html (estimating that the number of prostituted 
children worldwide “could be as high as 10 million”); see also End Child Prostitution, 
Child Pornography and Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes, available at 
http://www.ecpat.net/EI/Csec_onlineDatabase.asp (containing survey of sexually ex-
ploited children by state and reason). For articles highlighting CST numbers in specific 
regions, see Timothy Roche, Tourists Who Prey on Kids, Time, Feb. 15, 1999, at 58; Di Cael-
ers, Child-Sex Tourists Target Cape Town’s Juvenile Prostitutes, Afr. News, Feb. 5, 1999; Kate 
Connolly, Sex in a Cold Climate: On the E55 Highway That Runs Along the Border Between the 
Czech Republic and Germany, Sex Tourism is Booming, Guardian, Jan. 5, 1999, at 44. 
3 See Seabrook, supra note 1, at xi (noting that two-thirds of the 6 million annual tour-
ists to Thailand during the mid-1990s were unaccompanied men, and speculating that 
“some percentage were CST offenders”); Svensson, supra note 1, at 645 (noting that CST 
numbers are uncertain because most perpetrators escape detection); Tracy Agyemang, 
Note, Reconceptualizing Child Sexual Exploitation as a Bias Crime Under the Protect Act, 12 Car-
dozo J.L. Gender 937, 939 (2006) (noting that the number of tourists is not easily calcu-
lable). 
4 Vickie F. Li, Child Sex Tourism to Thailand: The Role of the United States as a Consumer 
Country, 4 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J. 505, 516 (1995); see also Lucy Ward, Cook Cracks Down on 
Child Sex Tourism; Britain Leads Crusade Against Paedophiles: International Co-operation to Target 
Prostitution Trade, Guardian, Apr. 1, 1999, at 3 (reporting 250,000 Western child-sex tour-
ists visiting Asia yearly); Aaron Sachs, The Last Commodity, Child Prostitution in the Developing 
World, World Watch, July/Aug. 1994, at 26, 28 (discussing explosive growth of sex tour-
ism industry). 
5 Eric Thomas Berkman, Note, Responses to the International Child Sex Tourism Trade, 19 
B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 397, 408 (1996). 
6 See Stacey Mathews, International Trafficking in Children: Will New U.S. Legislation Provide 
an Ending to the Story?, 27 Hous. J. Int’l L. 649, 658–59 (2005); see also Eleanor Clift, Foreword 
to Gilbert King, Woman, Child for Sale: The New Slave Trade in the 21st Century 4 
(2004) (asserting that sex trade crosses all boundaries). But see Julia O’Connell Davidson, 
Children in the Global Sex Trade 7–10 (2005) (suggesting that awareness of CST is what 
has grown in recent years, not the problem itself). 
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 Compounding the scale of the crisis is the destructive impact of 
CST on victims and their communities. Repetitive sexual abuse physi-
cally and emotionally scars children.7 Victims endure violence from 
handlers, pimps and patrons alike.8 The abuse often damages the vic-
tims’ immature sex organs and increases their risk of contracting dis-
eases such as AIDS.9 Furthermore, the children’s mental vulnerability 
often results in psychological trauma.10 All of these factors converge 
to diminish victim life expectancy rates.11 
 CST not only claims child victims, it also ruptures families, causes 
cultural disintegration, and endangers public health.12 Struggling com-
munities, seduced by the short-term financial gain that frequently ac-
companies CST, divest themselves of vital human capital needed for 
sustainable development.13 Moreover, CST gives rise to both corruption 
and organized crime, which overwhelms local law enforcement.14 
 This Article assesses the recent state and international efforts to 
combat global CST, focusing particularly on the Council of Europe’s 
(COE) Convention on the Protection of Children Against Sexual Ex-
ploitation and Abuse (Convention).15 Part I briefly explores the crimi-
nological contours of CST offenses by describing perpetrators, victims, 
and root causes. Part II investigates the utility of various national efforts 
to fight CST, including those of Destination States (where the unlawful 
contact occurs), and Sending States, (where sex tourists originate). Fi-
nally, Part III assesses the successes and failures of relevant provisions in 
the recent COE Convention. 
 Ultimately, the rate of CST offenses compared to the sparse 
number of convictions strongly suggests the inadequacy of current law 
                                                                                                                      
7 King, supra note 6, at 16; 2008 TIP Report, supra note 2, at 25; Reuters Health, 
supra note 2. 
8 See Abigail Schwartz, Sex Trafficking in Cambodia, 17 Colum. J. Asian L. 371, 400–01 
(2004). 
9 See id. at 401–02; Nicholas D. Kristof, Children for Sale: Asian Childhoods Sacrificed to 
Prosperity’s Lust, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1996, at A8; see also Reuters Health, supra note 2 
(reporting that millions of children are infected with STDs, have abortions, attempt sui-
cide and are raped each year). 
10 See King, supra note 6, at 16; Schwartz, supra note 8, at 402; Elizabeth Bevilacqua, 
Child Sex Tourism and Child Prostitution in Asia: What Can Be Done to Protect the Rights of Chil-
dren Abroad Under International Law?, 5 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 171, 172 (1998). 
11 See Reuters Health, supra note 2. 
12 See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 396–401. 
13 See id. 
14 See id. 
15 Council of Europe, Convention on the Protection of Children Against Sexual Ex-
ploitation and Sexual Abuse, Oct. 25, 2007, CETS No. 201, available at http://conventions. 
coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/201.htm [hereinafter Convention]. 
4 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 32:1 
enforcement efforts. Yet even a significant increase in convictions at-
tained by Sending States is unlikely to sufficiently diminish this global 
problem unless it is matched by heightened enforcement and preven-
tion efforts in Destination States. This article argues that addressing 
CST requires comprehensive legislation at both the state and interna-
tional levels and increased international cooperation, which together 
will motivate Destination States to prosecute offenders and support 
local initiatives for victim prevention, protection and assistance. 
I. CST: A Crime of International Concern 
 Because CST has only recently attracted global attention, many of 
the underlying sociological and criminological forces are not fully un-
derstood. Nevertheless, several key aspects of the CST phenomenon are 
describable. 
A. A Trend Among Trends 
 CST is intimately linked with the fastest growing international 
criminal trend: human trafficking.16 Current estimates indicate that 
approximately 13 million persons—80% of whom are female and ap-
proximately 50% of whom are children—have been trafficked, both 
internally and across borders.17 The majority of these women and 
children are trafficked for purposes of commercial sexual exploita-
tion, or sex trafficking.18 CST, as a prevalent type of sexual exploita-
tion, relies heavily on this victim base. 19 
B. Victims 
 CST victims principally come from rural communities and im-
poverished families in underdeveloped or destabilized states in East 
Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe.20 Targeted victims 
                                                                                                                      
16 See 2008 TIP Report, supra note 2, at 3, 23–25; LeRoy G. Potts, Jr., Global Trafficking 
in Human Beings: Assessing the Success of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent Trafficking in 
Persons, 35 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 227, 227 (2003). 
17 2008 TIP Report, supra note 2, at 7; see also King, supra note 6, at 13–14. 
18 See 2008 TIP Report, supra note 2, at 23; see also Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 22 
U.S.C.A. § 7102(9) (2003) (defining sex trafficking as “the recruitment, harboring, transpor-
tation, provision, or obtaining of a person for the purposes of a commercial sex act”). 
19 See Agyemang, supra note 3, at 945. 
20 See Karene Jullien, The Recent International Efforts to End Commercial Sexual Exploitation 
of Children, 31 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 579, 583 (2003); see also King, supra note 6, at 9 
(“the profit potential of forced slavery is at its greatest when there are weak economies and 
war destabilized regions”); Schwartz, supra note 8, at 381–91 (explaining historical, eco-
 
2009] International Legislative Efforts to Combat Child Sex Tourism 5 
are often members of marginalized populations that are lacking in 
educational and economic opportunities.21 These disempowered vic-
tims are neither able to help themselves nor affect political change.22 
 Generally, victims fall between the ages of thirteen and eighteen, 
though the under-thirteen victim population is growing.23 While vic-
tims tend to be female, the likelihood of whether a particular child 
will be victimized by sex tourists depends on the market in the Desti-
nation State. For example, 90% of Sri Lanka’s prostituted children are 
male,24 while Thailand’s are predominantly female.25 
C. Perpetrators 
 Perpetrators in the CST industry resist monolithic profiles. While 
commentators tend to focus on patrons of child sex, CST crimes in-
volve a host of complicit persons.26 
1. Traffickers 
 International or regional criminal syndicates regularly supply the 
CST market with children.27 Traffickers facilitate the recruitment, 
transport, detention, and sale of children.28 Recruiters offer employ-
                                                                                                                      
nomic and cultural characteristics of “Sending States” in South East Asia). See generally Hé-
lia Barbosa, Family Perspectives: Social and Economical Origins, Causes, Prevention and 
Care in Brazil ( Jan. 1999), http://unesdoch.unesco.org/images/0011/001147/114739eo. 
pdf (discussing characteristics of South American States where children are taken into sex 
trafficking). For a criticism of the effectiveness of “Sending State” law enforcement, see 
Eva J. Klain, Am. Bar Assoc. Ctr. on Children and the Law, Prostitution of Chil-
dren and Child-Sex Tourism: An Analysis of Domestic and International Re-
sponses 38 (1999). 
21 Mathews, supra note 6, at 659. 
22 Id.; see also Trafficking in Women and Children in East Asia and Beyond: A Review of U.S. 
Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on E. Asian and Pac. Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, 108th Cong. 26–27 (2003) (statement of Gary A. Haugen, President & CEO, 
International Justice Mission). 
23 See Jonathan Todres, Prosecuting Sex Tour Operators in U.S. Courts in an Effort to Reduce 
the Sexual Exploitation of Children Globally, 9 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 1, 1, n.3 (1999). See generally 
Theresa Tan, Moves to Curb Worrying Rise in Child Sex Tourism, Straits Times (Sing.), Apr. 
27, 2005 (reporting case of prostituted three year-old Filipino girl). 
24 Cohen, supra note 2, at 42. 
25 Id. For an informative discussion of the historical elements affecting these gender 
trends in CST in Southeast Asian States see Schwartz, supra note 8, at 381–91. 
26 See, e.g., Timothy Roche & Julia Powell, Tourists Who Prey on Kids: Central America Is the 
New Hunting Ground for Pedophiles. Can a U.S. Law Stop Them?, Time, Feb. 15, 1999, at 58. 
27 See King, supra note 6, at 15; see also Becki Young, Trafficking of Humans Across United 
States Borders: How United States Laws Can Be Used to Punish Traffickers and Protect Victims, 13 
Geo. Immigr. L.J. 73, 79 (1998). 
28 See Potts, supra note 16, at 228–30. 
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ment opportunities—legal or illegal—in remote locations.29 When 
such recruitment efforts fail, traffickers often simply procure victims 
by abduction.30 
 Once in the control of traffickers, children are usually removed 
from their communities, further increasing their vulnerability.31 Traf-
fickers then either sell them to vendors or market them directly. In 
either case, victims are forcibly held and made to provide sexual ser-
vices to patrons, many of whom are sex tourists.32 Traffickers gain vic-
tim compliance by fabricating debt, confiscating identity documents, 
plying victims with drugs, and threatening and using violence.33 Such 
tactics discourage escape and attempts to notify the authorities.34 
2. Sex Tour Operators 
 A group of perpetrators involved in CST, who sometimes partner 
with traffickers, are so-called “sex tour operators.” Operating predomi-
nantly in industrialized countries, certain travel agencies arrange tour 
packages for tourists who seek sexual encounters with children.35 In 
addition to securing standard travel accommodations, operators ar-
range local guides who facilitate sexual encounters at brothels popu-
lated with prostituted children.36 The number of sex tour operators has 
increased in recent years, multiplying patrons’ avenues for exploitation. 
3. Patrons 
 The group most responsible for driving the CST industry is the 
actual patrons who seek child sex.37 Generally, patrons are drawn to a 
destitute state by low-risk and affordable sexual access to children, as 
                                                                                                                      
29 See Tal Raviv, International Trafficking in Persons: A Focus on Women and Children—The 
Current Situations and the Recent International Legal Response, 9 Cardozo Women’s L.J. 659, 
662 (2003); see also Trafficking of Women and Children in the International Sex Trade: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on International Operations in Human Rights, 106th Cong. 11–12 (1999) 
(statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor) (testifying to the forced labor of victims of the international 
sex trade). 
30 See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 377–78. 
31 See id. at 376. 
32 Potts, supra note 16, at 231–32. 
33 Id. at 229–30. 
34 Schwartz, supra note 8, at 376. 
35 See Todres, supra note 23, at 4. 
36 See id.; see also Toddi Gutner & Ron Corben, Asian Sex Tours Are an American Business, 
Too, Bus. Wk., June 17, 1996, at 46. 
37 Svensson, supra note 1, at 643. 
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well as the enhanced anonymity that comes in a foreign country.38 Pa-
trons represent diverse groups.39 Despite frequent mischaracterizations, 
patrons are not exclusively, or even predominantly, Western pedo-
philes.40 Locals account for a significant portion, and at times the ma-
jority, of patrons.41 Even when patrons are foreigners, they are not nec-
essarily Westerners.42 Japanese men reportedly constitute the largest 
number of CST perpetrators in many Asian countries.43 The most con-
sistent characteristic of patrons is that they originate from compara-
tively affluent states, with more stringent law enforcement for child sex 
crimes. 
 Many patrons are not, in fact, pedophiles, defined as persons 
sexually aroused by physically underdeveloped children, or those un-
der the age of thirteen.44 The narrowness of this definition is signifi-
cant because of the distinction between preferential patrons (those 
who actively seek sexual encounters with children) and opportunistic 
or circumstantial patrons (those who have sex with minors if the op-
portunity presents itself).45 Though either type of patron can be a pe-
dophile, opportunistic patrons likely are not. They may initially travel 
for legitimate purposes, and then, free of their own society’s moral 
restraints, choose to experiment.46 Identifying all patrons as pedo-
philes implies that they principally seek sex with pre-pubescent chil-
dren.47 But because in most modern legal systems the age of sexual 
majority does not coincide with the age of puberty, even persons who 
                                                                                                                      
38 See Agyemang, supra note 3, at 941–42. 
39 U.N. GAOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Chil-
dren: Interim Report by the Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child 
Pornography, ¶¶ 18–21, U.N. Doc. A/51/456 (Oct. 7, 1996) (prepared by Ofelia Calcetas-
Santos). 
40 See Davidson, supra note 6, at 127–28; Carol Smolenski, The Commercial Sexual Exploi-
tation of Children: How to Fight Back, Cath. Women, Sept./Oct. 1998, at 4; Berkman, supra 
note 5, at 397; see also Coalition Against Trafficking in Women, Trafficking in Women and 
Prostitution in the Asia Pacific: Fact Sheet, http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/apmap. 
htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (noting that Japanese men constitute the largest number of 
sex tourists in Asia). 
41 See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 383–84; Reuters Health, supra note 2. 
42 Svensson, supra note 1, at 651. But see Seabrook, supra note 1, at ix. 
43 Svensson, supra note 1, at 651 (quoting ECPAT International Report); see also King, 
supra note 6, at 21 (noting that sex trade from Japan generates $400 million annually). 
44 See Davidson, supra note 6, at 85 (citing to the American Psychiatric Association’s 
1995 manual). 
45 Seabrook, supra note 1, at x. 
46 See id.; see also Svensson, supra note 1, at 641. 
47 Davidson, supra note 6, at 85–86. 
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actively seek sex with persons considered to be minors under state law 
may not be pedophiles.48 
 Influential definitions like those used by the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) and United Nations (UN), which narrowly identify of-
fenders as persons who engage in tourism with the “primary purpose” 
of “commercial exchanges” for child sex, advance the problem of mis-
characterization by omitting opportunistic sex tourists.49 The frequency 
with which foreigners avail themselves of child sex via informal com-
mercial arrangements adds additional difficulties to the task of defining 
patrons. Sex industries of Destination States often have both formal 
and informal markets.50 In the latter, sexual arrangements with prosti-
tuted children can look remarkably non-commercial, with prostitutes 
performing both sex labor and non-sex labor for patrons.51 Child pros-
titutes may also behave like romantic companions during prolonged 
periods of time and for unspecified monetary amounts.52 Alternatively, 
tourists may integrate into communities and obtain child sex through 
systematic gift giving.53 Statutes risk being under-inclusive when they 
blindly adhere to the prominent but misguided definitions of CST pa-
trons that only contemplate traditional commercial arrangements 
within formal sex markets. 
 Accurately identifying perpetrators is essential for good crimino-
logical analysis and effective law enforcement. For example, oppor-
tunistic sex tourists may well be more susceptible to legal deterrents 
than preferential sex tourists, and legislation must be sensitive to this 
difference in order to be successful.54 Ultimately, legislation must con-
sider all perpetrators, and not merely patrons, to be effective. 
                                                                                                                      
48 See id. 
49 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n On Human Rights, Rights of the Child: Report 
of Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, ¶ 56, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/1996/100 ( Jan. 17, 1996) (prepared by Ofelia Calcetas-Santos); see also World 
Tourism Org., Statement on the Prevention of Organized Sex Tourism, Adopted by the 
General Assembly of the World Tourism Organization, Res. A/Res/338(XI) (Oct. 17–22, 
1995) (defining “organized sex tourism” as “trips organized . . . with the primary purpose 
of effecting a commercial sexual relationship by the tourist with residents at the destina-
tion.”). 
50 Davidson, supra note 6, at 132–33. 
51 Id. at 133. 
52 Id. 
53 See id. at 126. 
54 See Seabrook, supra note 1, at x. 
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D. Economic, Political, and Cultural Causes 
 As CST is an entrenched, complex problem, there is no single ex-
planation for why the industry is thriving. Some causes appear perva-
sive, while others are state-specific. Essentially, CST is a niche service-
market that operates according to basic supply and demand principles. 
Many of its contributing factors appear rooted in state impoverishment, 
and consequently, an economic analysis of CST is necessary for a full 
understanding. 
 Given the market’s scale, CST is unsurprisingly lucrative for its 
criminal actors.55 Addditionally, states also have a financial stake in CST. 
Tourism is the single largest global industry,56 and sex tourism gener-
ates billions of dollars for many Destination States with associated, le-
gitimate tourist industries.57 Between 2–14% of the GDPs of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand can be linked to sex tourism.58 
Significant economic ties with CST have been forged in Destination 
States, which helps explain why they continually fail to address it. 
 Historically, to obtain sex tourism-related monies, Destination 
States have insufficiently protected59 and even victimized vulnerable 
groups within their population.60 Though no state has ever explicitly 
promoted CST, states have tolerated it by failing to enact or enforce 
criminal statutes.61 Some states indirectly encourage CST by enacting 
polices that rapidly develop prostitution.62 The most notorious exam-
ples are various wartime arrangements between states that provide sex-
ual services to foreign military personnel on overseas deployment.63 
Such legislation legitimizes and regulates brothels for military men, 
                                                                                                                      
55 See King, supra note 6, at 19; Cohen, supra note 2, at 42; Susan Tiefenbrun, Updating 
the Domestic and International Impact of the U.S. Victims of Trafficking Protection Act of 2000: Does 
Law Deter Crime? 38 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 249, 249–50 (2007); Cohen, supra note 2, at 42. 
56 Seabrook, supra note 1, at xi (“The expansion of travel and vacations, journeys, and 
holidays have made tourism the largest single industry on earth.”). 
57 Schwartz, supra note 8, at 389; see also Lin Lean Lim, The Economic and Social Bases of 
Prostitution in Southeast Asia, in The Sex Sector: The Economic and Social Bases of 
Prostitution in Southeast Asia 1, 7–10 (Lin Lean Lim ed., 1998). 
58 See Lim, supra note 57, at 7. 
59 Seabrook, supra note 1, at ix. 
60 See Mathews, supra note 6, at 661. 
61 King, supra note 6, at 2, 9, 15; Seabrook, supra note 1, at ix. 
62 See Svensson, supra note 1, at 645; Maya Raghu, Note, Sex Trafficking of Thai Women 
and the United States Asylum Response, 12 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 145, 163 (1997). 
63 See Thanh-Dam Truong, Sex Money and Morality: Prostitution and Tourism 
in Southeast Asia 99, 155–56 (1990) (providing detailed analysis of Thailand’s 1967 Ser-
vice Establishments Act and the 1967 Rest and Recreation Treaty in effect during the Viet-
nam War). 
10 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 32:1 
bolstering the Destination State’s sex industry.64 The World Bank indi-
rectly encouraged the growth of this tourism base as part of an “export 
strategy,”65 and numerous Destination States officially adopted this eco-
nomic stimulation plan.66 Critics contend that key actors within the 
World Bank and state governments knew that these policies indirectly 
subsidized the sex industry and charge them with promoting tourism 
with a sex package.67 
 States that simply viewed sex tourism as an “inevitable, and fairly 
unproblematic, by-product” of economic development are also culpa-
ble.68 For example, “Kisaeng”69 tours for Japanese tourists formed a 
part of South Korea’s plan for economic development.70 Likewise, sen-
ior Chinese officials have argued that prostitution is inevitable in any 
emerging economy.71 
 Though CST is driven by economic gain, victim impoverishment 
generates the vulnerability that ultimately enables it.72 Where poverty is 
widespread, CST thrives. For example, before the CST boom erupted 
throughout the Golden Triangle, industrialism triggered rampant con-
sumerism that disadvantaged rural villages throughout the region.73 
Logging projects destroyed forestlands that had previously sustained 
                                                                                                                      
64 Steven Schlossstein, Asia’s New Little Dragons: The Dynamic Emergence of 
Indonesia, Thailand, & Malaysia 197 (1991). 
65 Sachs, supra note 4, at 28. 
66 See id. 
67 Id. at 28, 30 (discussing complicity of Robert McNamara, President of the World 
Bank in the 1970s, who also facilitated the 1967 Rest and Recreation treaty with Thailand 
as U.S. Secretary of Defense). 
68 Davidson, supra note 6, at 128. 
69 Traditionally, kisaeng were a female slave class in Korea. Like their better-known 
Japanese counterparts, geishas, kisaeng were often highly trained entertainers, additionally 
valued for their erotic services. During the 1970s, many (predominantly Japanese) tourists 
purchased kisaeng services, erotic and otherwise, revenue from which was delivered to the 
South Korean government. See John Lie, The Transformation of Sexual Work in 20th-Century 
Korea, Gender and Society, June 1995, at 310. See generally Matsui Yayori & Lora Sharnoff, 
Sexual Slavery in Korea, Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies (1977). 
70 See Swasti Mitter, Common Fate, Common Bond: Women in the Global Econ-
omy 64 (1986). 
71 See Davidson, supra note 6, at 128. 
72 See id; see also Schwartz, supra note 8, at 410; Dateline: Children for Sale (NBC updated 
transcript Jan. 9, 2005), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4038249. 
73 Paul Robinson, Exposed—The Ugliest Australians, Sunday Age (Austl.), Apr. 18, 1993, 
at 4. 
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villages.74 The ensuing rural poverty was exacerbated by a population 
spike and rapid urban modernization.75 
 The collapse of rural economies coincided with a rising urban 
demand for child prostitutes.76 As income from prostitution is some-
times twenty-five times greater than legitimate rural wages, many des-
titute families succumb to the temptation of immediate financial gain 
and exploit their children.77 Families often are forced to choose be-
tween prostituting their children, selling them outright to recruiters, 
or accepting ill-advised loans with exorbitant interest, payment of 
which is performed through child sex work.78 In most cases, the prob-
lem is compounded by the fact that the children rarely receive the full 
financial benefit of their sex work.79 
 The poverty of victims is only exploitable because of the com-
parative affluence of CST perpetrators, particularly the patrons.80 The 
widening economic gap between developing and developed states al-
lows for sex tourists with significant disposable income, who in turn 
drive demand in Destination States.81 
 Several globalization trends enhance these market forces. The ease 
and affordability of travel, for example, along with increased communi-
cation via the Internet, has enhanced sex tourist mobility.82 Ironically, 
this “mobility trend” does not extend to the poor of Destination 
States.83 Rather, economic desperation constricts legal immigration 
possibilities and increases susceptibility to trafficking.84 Desperate and 
poor individuals are baited by trafficker promises. Increasingly porous 
borders, which facilitate the legal migration of the affluent, merely help 
to mask the traffickers’ transportation of their illicit human cargo.85 
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 Beyond political and economic factors, CST is perpetuated by 
deeply-rooted cultural beliefs and stereotypes. Traditional views of male 
dominance support domestic consumption of child sex.86 Inaccurate 
beliefs about AIDS transmission also contribute; many consumers 
falsely assume that youthful prostitutes are less likely to be infected.87 
Other cultural beliefs suggest that sex with virgins will cure infections88 
or increase male longevity.89 Finally, family choices to exploit their chil-
dren are sometimes reinforced by cultural beliefs that children should 
support their aging parents, encouraging prostitution by children with 
no other means of doing so.90 
 While most commentators agree that CST is steadily increasing, 
others are skeptical. Several contend that while the frequency and 
prominence of reports has risen, no evidence of an increase in actual 
offenses exists.91 Julia O’Connell Davidson forcefully argues that the 
current fascination with stories of abuse is simply a function of the crav-
ings of Westerners for such stories.92 These social reactions can be 
linked, according to Davidson, to a new socially constructed “fetishiza-
tion” of children.93 She concludes that there is simply nothing new 
about the commercial sexual exploitation of children “except the term 
itself.”94 
 It is not clear if this brand of skepticism is well founded. Admit-
tedly, the data concerning the incidents of abuse is not optimal. How-
ever, this is unsurprising if one supposes, as most experts do, that traf-
ficking in its current form is a modern criminal trend. Further, to 
suggest—as Davidson does—that the policy decisions of Destination 
States and the phenomena of globalization have had no impact at all 
on the number of abuses seems improbable. 
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II. Criminalization and Enforcement Efforts of  
Destination Countries 
 Ideally, the frontline against CST would involve the law enforce-
ment systems of states where offenses occur. Law enforcement pro-
ceedings are most effective when temporally and spatially proximate 
to the crime.95 Detection of offenses is more likely, evidence is easier 
to gather and present, witnesses are more accessible for interview and 
testimony, and linguistic and cultural hurdles are less problematic. 
Addressing crimes domestically shortens the time between offenses 
and prosecutions, reduces party bias, improves cost effectiveness, and 
prompts higher rates of conviction. Any introduction of a transna-
tional element to enforcement proceedings significantly retards these 
advantages. 
 As things exist today, the law enforcement mechanisms of Desti-
nation States rarely move with the desired level of force against CST 
perpetrators.96 A principal failure of such states has been the absence 
of laws addressing child sexual exploitation.97 For the most part, tour-
ism-dependant Destination States have been politically hesitant to 
adopt laws or policies that might endanger revenue by discouraging 
potential tourists who tailor itineraries to include destinations with 
favorable criminal codes.98 Informal state policies of tolerance toward 
CST have fostered sluggishness towards legislative reform.99 
 Alternatively, where prostitution-related law exists, weak or misdi-
rected statutory enforcement mechanisms undermine its effective-
ness. The application of criminal laws either selectively penalize only 
the prostituted person’s behavior or it fails to penalize perpetrators in 
a way that reflects the gravity of the offenses.100 
 Under international pressure, most Destination States have begun 
to modernize their criminal codes by equipping them with stronger, 
CST-related provisions.101 The statutory trend among these States has 
been to identify children as victims of exploitation, a practice that im-
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munizes the victims from prosecution. Other legal developments in-
clude the criminalization of sexual contact with minors102 and stiffer 
penalties for CST patrons, traffickers, and brothel owners.103 
 Despite these advances, statutory deficiencies persist. Some states 
prosecute prostituted minors involved in homosexual acts, a legal arti-
fact of Western colonialization.104 Consequently, CST victims who par-
ticipate in homosexual sex acts often fail to report offenses. The 
adults, conversely, can exploit the well-trodden avenues of corruption 
described above and offend with impunity, making such states havens 
for foreign men seeking sexual encounters with boys.105 
 Another statutory deficiency is the lack of provisions that specifi-
cally address CST as a distinct form of sexual exploitation with unique 
contours. An example of the statutory failure of merely offering more 
generalized protections is a recently proposed amendment to Sri 
Lanka’s criminal code that lowers the age of consent to thirteen.106 
Currently, Sri Lanka criminalizes sex with female persons under the 
age of sixteen,107 a potentially useful legal tool against rampant CST. 
Reportedly, Sri Lankan men were being incarcerated for having sex-
ual intercourse with their underage romantic partners.108 The pro-
posed statute provides that cases involving persons under twenty-one 
apprehended for having sexual contact with persons twelve years and 
under will be reviewed by the Attorney General.109 This fix highlights 
the dangers of failing to statutorily address CST directly. Though the 
solution addresses over-penalization problems, it invites corruption 
from officials charged with oversight. It might be better to have a tai-
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lored, statutory approach to CST offenses by attaching provisions di-
rectly addressing non-nationals committing commercialized sex acts. 
 Even with their shortcomings, the Destination States’ newly re-
vamped statutes, if strictly enforced, have the potential to significantly 
reduce CST crimes. Unfortunately, enforcement has been sluggish, 
and critics have criticized legal reforms as merely cosmetic.110 Princi-
pal encumbrances to effective enforcement include corruption and 
inadequate resources.111 
 Corruption is nurtured by prior state policies, both explicit and 
implicit, which tolerate CST as a non-serious offense. Such policies cre-
ate lax attitudes toward CST among officials who often tolerate offenses 
(and sometimes violate the law themselves).112 Now entrenched, these 
attitudes resist top-down policy changes and perpetrators continue to 
receive a soft hand at the local level. Consequently, traffickers move 
with impunity and patrons act without fear of real punishment from 
Destination States, except perhaps deportation.113 
 Corruption is also linked to insufficient state resources. Underpaid 
law enforcement personnel are susceptible to bribes from perpetra-
tors.114 For example, the meager salary of Cambodian judges, fifteen 
dollars a week, is significantly augmented by routine bribes. Sadly, this 
patterned abuse provides CST perpetrators a relatively easy way to ei-
ther avoid arrest or ensure early release from detention.115 
 Insufficient resources may also mean that law enforcement and 
judiciary personnel lack proper training and equipment to suppress 
CST. Police are often ill-prepared to combat highly sophisticated, tech-
nologically advanced traffickers who utilize various methods of avoiding 
detection.116 Insufficient resources may also cripple courts. For exam-
ple, the Khmer Rouge robbed Cambodia of adequately trained legal 
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professionals; as a result, those who remain struggle with the imple-
mentation of the state’s potentially powerful anti-CST legislation.117 
 Under-training also allows outmoded practices to persist in both 
law enforcement and judiciary systems. The adversarial questioning of 
child prostitutes by authorities is an excellent example, as it often 
garners incomplete or inaccurate information from intimidated and 
uncooperative victims.118 Worse, interrogated children frequently 
evade subsequent encounters with authorities, which can compromise 
future legal proceedings.119 These results are similar to the difficulties 
experienced with child witnesses during courtroom proceedings that 
lack child-sensitive practices.120 
 Antiquated practices can also undermine otherwise successful law 
enforcement efforts. A review of documented cases shows that sex tour-
ists who have their passports confiscated prior to bail release are repeat-
edly successful in securing new passports at their embassies in order to 
leave the country.121 In part, this miscarriage of justice reveals that poor 
communication practices between local authorities and foreign State 
departments can frustrate both institutions.122 Ultimately, it seems that 
releasing foreign sex criminals on bail into a state with demonstrably 
porous borders shows a failure to appreciate these perpetrators as obvi-
ous flight risks. Offering bail to CST offenders is a practice held over 
from times past when CST crimes were not taken seriously. 
 Some Destination States are updating practices to fight CST and 
curb corruption. For example, Sri Lanka recently tightened laws by 
making pedophilia a non-bailable offense, which prevents the flight of 
alleged perpetrators.123 Further, under the advisement of Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Sri Lanka instituted child sen-
sitive measures by amending its Evidence Ordinance to permit child 
video testimony in court proceedings, diminishing the risk of psycho-
logical trauma to child victims.124 When child victims do participate in 
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judicial proceedings, formalities are relaxed to make them more com-
fortable.125 Finally, reforms are augmented by the creation of the Na-
tional Child Protection Agency (NCPA), which was charged with the 
promotion of legal reform, monitoring and improvement of en-
forcement activities.126 For example, the NCPA recently established 
the “Cyber Watch” Unit, which monitors websites in order to prevent 
the use of Sri Lankan children for the purposes of child pornography 
and other forms of commercial sexual exploitation.127 
 Overall, Destination States have yet to meet the challenges pre-
sented by CST crimes. Often, this failure is a result of stale institu-
tional practices ill-suited to political, social, and legal realities. Re-
forms are often ill-conceived or lack political backing, producing little 
or no positive changes. 
III. Sending State Legislation 
 The unfortunate reality of Destination State failure with regard to 
rampant CST underscores the need for Sending State involvement. 
Furthermore, as their citizens are a significant source of the demand 
that fuels CST, Sending States share a responsibility for prosecuting 
CST offenses. In light of this, numerous Sending States have passed 
legislation addressing CST offences. 
A. Extraterritorial Legislation 
 Over thirty-two States have enacted Extraterritorial (ET) legisla-
tion to address CST.128 ET legislation provides States with the jurisdic-
tion to conduct prosecutorial proceedings over certain persons for 
offenses committed abroad.129 While ET legislation can be an effective 
tool in combating CST,130 investigations and prosecutions encounter 
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numerous structural, procedural and evidentiary hurdles.131 Crafting 
successful ET legislation is largely a matter of surmounting these hur-
dles. 
1. ET Statutory Structure and Scope 
 Scope and jurisdictional reach are two critically important features 
of effective ET legislation,132 and both can be significantly expanded 
through adjustments to existing child exploitation statutes. Indeed, 
some states have broadened the ambit of criminal laws to cover more 
perpetrators, offenses and victims. 
a. Perpetrators 
 One such structural adjustment is enlarging the field of people 
able to be prosecuted for CST offenses. Current ET legislation varies 
in this respect. In part, this reflects the several theoretical bases for ET 
legislation. To date, most ET legislation relies on active or passive per-
sonality principles, under which jurisdiction is based on the victim or 
perpetrator’s nationality or resident status.133 Most States restrict the 
application of their ET legislation to nationals,134 while others extend 
the ambit of coverage to both nationals and residents.135 
 Some theorists assert that the devastating human rights impact of 
CST’s exploitative acts qualify them as “crimes against humanity,” and 
base jurisdiction on the universality principle.136 Though no state has 
explicitly based CST legislation on this principle,137 both Belgium138 
and Sweden139 extend application to persons who have merely passed 
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through their territories, which suggests a form of universal jurisdic-
tion to some commentators.140 While persons apprehended under ET 
legislation have predominantly been nationals, non-nationals seem no 
less likely to offend and should therefore be prosecutable under state 
criminal jurisdiction.141 
b. Offenses 
 ET legislative scope can be further enhanced by increasing the 
number of covered offenses. While CST principally involves commer-
cial sexual exploitation of children, it frequently coincides with other 
crimes.142 Examples which are commonly part of ET legislation in-
clude non-commercial child sex abuse and child pornography.143 
States have also criminalized conduct such as the inducement of mi-
nors into prostitution and the general corruption of minors as part of 
an overall anti-CST strategy.144 Criminalizing related crimes of CST 
enables law enforcement to prosecute even when evidence of the CST 
itself is weak.145 
 Not all states comprehensively address CST-related offenses. 
Generally, states exhibiting more complete coverage are those that 
apply their domestic penal codes extraterritorially.146 These penal 
codes have numerous provisions which bear on CST.147 One advan-
tage of this approach is that children abroad are afforded the same 
legal protections as domestic children. 
 A major shortfall of this strategy is that while domestic penal codes 
have relevant provisions, they are rarely CST-specific and therefore are 
unresponsive to the uniquely exploitative conditions of foreign victims 
and elements.148 In particular, they withhold special protections that 
CST victims require. While legal protections are ostensibly equal for 
children residing domestically and those abroad, actual protection is 
uneven. Some states compensate for this failure by augmenting their 
domestic legislation with provisions designed to facilitate CST prosecu-
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tions.149 Other states have adopted ET legislation specifically targeting 
CST.150 Either method should provide additional protection for vulner-
able children in Destination States. 
c. Dual Criminality 
 Another structural element that affects legislative scope is the dual 
criminality requirement, under which an offense must be recognized in 
both the prosecuting state and the state in which the offense oc-
curred.151 Dual criminality protects both the interests of states in which 
the crimes occur and those of foreign nationals traveling abroad. Be-
cause jurisdiction is based principally on territoriality, states generally 
set the legal norms within their own borders.152 Usually these norms 
exhaustively describe the legal duties of persons, including foreign na-
tionals.153 ET legislation creates an exception to this general rule by 
generating legal requirements for a state’s citizens traveling abroad.154 
The dual criminality requirement, however, significantly limits the ex-
ception created through ET legislation. The dual criminality require-
ment also appreciates that retaining legal assistance in foreign states 
can be problematic when the violation is unrecognized by that state. 
 Critics argue that when ET legislation addresses CST concerns, 
dual criminality requirements undermine the effectiveness of the leg-
islation.155 They encourage “criminal preference” among offenders 
who seek out states with reduced child protections and those who 
purchase experiences criminalized in their own countries.156 Perpetra-
tors can offend their state’s ET legislation and then return home with 
impunity. Dual criminality requirements are particularly contentious 
in CST cases involving states with different ages of consent. 
 Critics also assert that international legal norms,157 established by 
agreements such as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC),158 create an international duty for states to assist the 
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defenseless.159 Many argue that these duties trump the opposing in-
terests of states or traveling nationals, and that a failure to prosecute 
because of dual criminality restrictions implies that states prioritize 
protection for their nationals.160 Critics construe this prioritization as 
untoward solidarity or even as blatant racism.161 
 While these criticisms are without legal force, the fact that dual 
criminality has the potential to derail convictions of CST offenders is 
uncontested. A trend is developing to drop dual criminality require-
ments for CST crimes.162 This ameliorates the obstacle of inadequate 
CST legislation in Destination States, and increases the scope of ET 
legislation. Where Destination States mainly suffer from poor en-
forcement—rather than inadequate laws—the benefit of excising this 
prerequisite is limited, however. 
d. Victims 
 Perhaps the most contentious structural element affecting legisla-
tive scope is the age of consent for CST victims. Current ages of con-
sent represented in ET legislation vary from thirteen to eighteen.163 
The protections afforded also vary depending upon the particular 
nature of the offense.164 
 States with lower ages of consent tend to be those that apply their 
domestic law extraterritorially. Such states appear reluctant to penal-
ize sex with sexually mature consenting minors residing within their 
territories.165 This may include sex between an adult and minor where 
no undue influence exists. These lower age limits may reflect cultural 
or social values about sexual maturity, as well as beliefs about the law’s 
relationship to sexual development and expression.166 
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 Some commentators propose harmonizing the age limit at eight-
een.167 They contend that the CRC, which defines persons under the 
age of eighteen as children and endorses numerous child protec-
tions,168 favors a universal definition.169 Some argue that because the 
provisions of the CRC are binding, member States should synchronize 
age limits.170 Moreover, because the CRC has received near-universal 
ratification,171 it has enhanced authority, prompting one advocate to 
suggest that CRC provisions are customary international law and bind 
both member and non-member states alike.172 
 Such conclusions are spurious. Though the CRC does define 
“child” as suggested, it also permits member states to set divergent age 
protections.173 Also, customary law requires that there be universal or 
near-universal state practice; the widespread variability among child 
protections upsets this element of customary law. Moreover, state de-
tractors represent persistent objectors, ultimately foreclosing any rea-
sonable claims that the CRC’s age provisions constitute customary law. 
 Advocates of harmonization note that when ET legislation re-
quires dual criminality, and age limits under the relevant state penal 
codes differ, the effectiveness of ET legislation is undermined.174 
Criminal preference draws offenders to states with lower age limits; 
because the victim’s age constitutes an element of the offense, suc-
cessful prosecutions require that state age provisions coincide. This 
issue is negated, however, if prosecuting states simply drop the dual 
criminality requirement. 
 Another argument for a universal standard of eighteen is that 
persons under that age simply cannot give informed consent.175 While 
this conclusion is perhaps overly broad, it has some merit with respect 
to CST. The deprivation in many Destination States strips a prosti-
tuted child’s “consent” of its autonomous character. Raising the age of 
consent in CST relevant legislation is one reasonable response to this 
enhanced vulnerability. In cases where Sending States wish to pre-
serve the domestic age of consent for minors, states should establish 
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CST-specific ET legislation and introduce special legal protections for 
foreign victims. 
2. Procedural Hurdles 
 Transnational prosecutions for CST raise unique procedural re-
quirements which further impact the effectiveness of ET legislation. 
Generally, procedural devices within ET legislation aim to address dif-
ferences among diverse legal systems, strengthen diplomatic relations, 
and avoid unfairness to accused persons. Yet these procedural mecha-
nisms sometimes impose burdens which may preclude investigations 
or add significant delay and cost.176 
 Some ET legislation prohibits any investigation or prosecution of 
accused persons until either a formal request is made by the state 
where the offenses occur, or a complaint is properly filed by the vic-
tim.177 Victim complaint prerequisites appear beneficial insofar as 
they forecast victim cooperation as well as the accusation’s veracity. 
Additionally, awaiting state requests promotes diplomacy where mul-
tiple states have competing interests in prosecuting offenders. Con-
sidering the extensive state assistance and cooperation that transna-
tional prosecutions require, such diplomacy has strong policy appeal. 
 Relying on formal state requests also preserves resources. A for-
mal Destination State request indicates that the case against the ac-
cused is both substantive and a priority for that government. When 
Destination States make requests, vital cooperation is likely to be 
forthcoming. Moreover, resource preservation is at issue where dou-
ble jeopardy restraints exist in the Sending State and the Destination 
State happens to initiate criminal proceedings against the accused.178 
Sending States avoid devoting significant resources to transnational 
proceedings that may end up being disrupted by extradition requests 
or convictions in absentia in Destination States.179 
 These procedures are not always followed. Despite evidence of an 
offense, for example, formal requests or complaints are often not 
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made.180 The former can be the result of numerous factors, such as a 
state being unaware of the formal request requirement, or simple gov-
ernment corruption or incompetance.181 The latter is often caused by 
individual victims’ lack of knowledge or resources. 
 When these procedural steps are not met, Sending State authori-
ties who have access to the accused and sufficient evidence of the al-
leged crime are frustrated. Complying with procedures can consume so 
much time that prosecutions are compromised. Fresh evidence grows 
stale, witnesses become less accessible, and statutes of limitation run. 
 Exasperated by these shortcomings, some states have abandoned 
these procedural encumbrances.182 For example, under parliamentary 
Bill C-15A, Canada eased the formal requirement of state requests,183 
amending criminal code sections 7(4.2) and (4.3) to permit prosecu-
tions upon permission from the Canadian Attorney General.184 Relin-
quishing this requirement seems to have facilitated convictions.185 
3. Evidentiary Hurdles 
 Law enforcement personnel encounter several challenges to effec-
tively gathering and presenting evidence in CST cases, including ob-
taining victim testimony and coordinating the transnational transfer of 
evidence while ensuring its integrity.186 The transnational aspect of CST 
enforcement proceedings is usually costly and cumbersome. Conse-
quently, Sending States tend to assign CST crimes a low priority.187 
a. Child Victim Testimony 
 Gleaning evidence from traumatized victims is a central chal-
lenge to transnational CST prosecutions.188 Both the volume of child 
prostitutes in popular CST Destination States and their transient life-
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styles make victim identification and location difficult.189 This location 
problem is compounded as transnational proceedings are often de-
layed. Aggressive handling by untrained law enforcement personnel 
exacerbates the avoidant behavior of victims and their reluctance to 
cooperate with investigations. Finally, even available victims who are 
willing to testify suffer from diminished recollection as time between 
offenses and prosecutions lengthens.190 
 Sending States can adopt various policy measures to alleviate dif-
ficulties in locating victims and securing quality testimony. A first step 
is increasing law enforcement cooperation with NGOs.191 NGOs fre-
quently provide credible reports of CST crimes.192 Their familiarity 
with the victim population can facilitate foreign and domestic law en-
forcement contacts and interviews.193 Also, NGO aftercare facilities 
provide housing and support services, which help maintain witness 
availability.194 Furthermore, their expertise in victim care can help 
ensure that law enforcement contact with victims is child sensitive. 
 Once law enforcement personnel have a working relationship with 
NGOs, efforts should be made to create a practice of recording victim 
statements shortly after the offenses; this will help ensure the quality, 
admissibility and availability of witness testimonies.195 Videotaped 
statements can preserve testimony where victims become inaccessible 
or exhibit poor recall.196 Videotaped depositions taken in the presence 
of defense lawyers help ensure admissibility in courts.197 Sending States 
can facilitate these measures by either training local law enforcement 
personnel or by establishing law enforcement liaisons in popular Desti-
nation States. Financial considerations may dictate a preference be-
tween these two approaches.198 
 Finally, because child victims can be traumatized by traveling to 
culturally unfamiliar states,199 resulting testimony may be compro-
mised or misconstrued by courts.200 As such, a mutual agreement by 
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the involved states to permit testimony via video or satellite link is ad-
visable. Because this technology is both costly and inconsistent with 
some states’ fair practice procedures, some commentators have found 
this use of technology impracticable.201 However, these aids seem 
more economical than transporting witnesses, and these aids appear 
to be the only way to ensure dependable witness testimony. Australia, 
a leader in addressing CST-related evidentiary issues, has imple-
mented several technology aids that have successfully enhanced victim 
protections and curbed the state’s prosecution expenditures. In par-
ticular, Australian courts permit foreign child witness testimony by 
video link when witness reliability is threatened by unreasonable ex-
pense, inconvenience, psychological harm, or intimidation.202 
 When victims do testify in foreign courts, testimonial aids should 
be implemented and court personnel should undergo cultural train-
ing. Some states have endorsed the use of closed-circuit television 
(CCTV), conditioned upon the presence of a support person during 
the testimony, while others have conducted closed proceedings.203 
These provisions both enhance victim protections and ultimately limit 
expenditures. 
b. Physical Evidence 
 In CST cases, physical evidence can include anything from con-
traception to sexual toys, gifts, and border control records, and even 
records from hotels where sexual activity occurred.204 The most com-
mon and vital evidence, however, are sexually explicit images of vic-
tims, and the equipment that manufactures and contains them.205 In-
creasingly, perpetrators record their crimes with photographic or 
video equipment for personal or communal consumption.206 Such 
evidence can play numerous roles in CST enforcement efforts. Dis-
covery of explicit images can spark CST investigations or substantiate 
existing allegations.207 Furthermore, some Sending State courts have 
allowed images to establish a victim’s age,208 the perpetrator’s knowl-
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edge of the victim’s age,209 or even the occurrence of a criminal act,210 
making the victim’s presence and testimony unnecessary.211 
 The prominence of images in CST prosecutions does create 
problems, however. A review of CST apprehensions suggests that au-
thorities have focused on particularly conspicuous offenders, such as 
those with images recording their exploits.212 Offenders can thus insu-
late themselves from detection by destroying or better concealing 
such evidence. Cautious and opportunistic CST offenders are less 
likely to endanger their anonymity by retaining incriminating evi-
dence. Furthermore, as digital imaging has grown more prominent, 
the need for commercial developers has been reduced. Without such 
physical evidence, elements of CST offenses are harder to establish, 
reliance on child victim testimony increases, and convictions become 
more difficult. Commentators have suggested that CST investigations 
can obviate the need for image-based evidence by conducting under-
cover sting operations.213 The preservation of evidence from Destina-
tion States, however, and the expense of foreign sting operations re-
main problematic for prosecutions. 
 Finally, consistent preservation and custody procedures between 
Sending and Destination State law enforcement officials are vital to the 
admissibility of physical evidence.214 Sending States can progress in this 
area by providing liaisons to local law enforcement and training them 
in relevant evidentiary standards.215 Though these measures have up-
front costs, they reduce the number of law enforcement agents from 
Destination States that are needed to testify, and ultimately reduce the 
costs of proceedings.216 Legislative measures taken in Destination States 
can also be helpful in easing some expected evidentiary difficulties.217 
For example, a Thai law empowers that state’s Attorney General to 
gather and transfer evidence to prosecuting states.218 
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B. Domestic Legislation 
 In addition to passing ET legislation, some Sending States have 
enacted domestic laws aimed at CST offenses occurring principally 
within their territory.219 The implementation of these laws creates a 
unique set of benefits and obstacles. 
1. Inchoate Crimes 
 Some Sending States have criminalized inchoate crimes that oc-
cur domestically. For example, under the U.S. PROTECT Act (Act), 
criminal liability exists if the accused traveled with the intent to en-
gage in sexual conduct with a minor.220 This intent provision offers 
several enforcement advantages. First, authorities can apprehend of-
fenders prior to the violation, preempting victimization. Second, no 
proof that a sexual violation actually occurred is required for convic-
tion.221 Where evidence of sexual violations is scant, convictions for 
these inchoate offenses may still be attainable. Finally, prosecutors can 
rely solely on stateside evidence and avoid the difficult and costly task 
of collecting evidence overseas.222 
 Establishing proof of intent is challenging. To alleviate this bur-
den, the Act acknowledges that sex with a minor need not be the pri-
mary purpose of travel.223 Nevertheless, when offenders raise compet-
ing purposes for traveling, establishing criminal intent can still be 
troublesome. In one successful prosecution, U.S. agents arrested John 
Seljan for violating the intent provision of the act as he boarded a 
plane for the Philippines.224 Proof of intent was established through 
intercepted correspondence and was corroborated by his possession 
of pornography, sexual aids, chocolate, and foreign currency.225 Cases 
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rarely yield such damning evidence, however. Because persons must 
possess criminal intent prior to travel, opportunistic offenders are not 
covered. Despite this, laws criminalizing inchoate crimes do expand 
the legal arsenal against CST.226 
2. Sex Tour Operator Prosecutions 
 Other forms of legislation target CST facilitators such as sex tour 
operators who operate within Sending States.227 Recently, the British 
government enacted legislation targeting domestic actors who organize 
sex tours or encourage others to sexually exploit children abroad.228 
Similarly, both Australia and New Zealand have legislation targeting 
operator activity.229 Australia criminalizes persons who act “with the in-
tent of benefiting from or encouraging” prohibited conduct.230 New 
Zealand outlaws conduct that facilitates CST, such as making travel ar-
rangements or printing or publishing information intended to pro-
mote child sex tours.231 
 Prosecuting sex tour operators can be a complicated process, how-
ever. As one commentator notes, there are no “paedophile [sic] pack-
age tour operators.”232 Rather, child sex tourists are principally aided by 
mainstream tour operators233 who invariably deny that their tours in-
volve children and assert that it is not their intention for their custom-
ers to exploit minors.234 These agents make themselves known to inter-
ested parties by way of thinly-veiled advertisements that fall just short of 
promising commercial sex.235 Discreet sex tour advertisements may 
boast an introduction to a “female companion” who accompanies the 
tourist,236 or they may pose as “match-making” services.237 
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 Despite these hurdles, it is still possible to establish the requisite 
criminal elements for offenses committed by operators.238 One ele-
ment, criminal encouragement, is evidenced by tour advertisements 
motivate individuals to travel abroad for illicit sex.239 Despite carefully-
worded brochures, sex with child prostitutes is the determinative fac-
tor for numerous consumers purchasing advertised services.240 Opera-
tors facilitate these offenses with their services.241 
 Another common element linked to operators is criminal intent. 
Because the high incidence of child prostitution in Destination States 
has been widely reported, operators should be considered to have 
constructive knowledge.242 Combined with the fact that operators 
arrange tours to red light districts with rampant child prostitution and 
abysmal enforcement, it may be possible to prove that operators in-
tend for their clientele to engage in CST.243 
 Despite some practical difficulties, legislation targeting sex tour 
operators does help diminish CST. Unlike legislation aimed at pa-
trons, shutting down sex tour operators eliminates entire avenues.244 
Perhaps more importantly, prosecuting operators helps raise public 
awareness and deters perpetrators.245 
3. Incentive-Based Aid and Sanctions 
 Though legislation expanding Sending State prosecutorial capac-
ity is crucial, there are limitations. In particular, detection rates of of-
fenders and the root causes behind victim vulnerability are insuffi-
ciently impacted. Accordingly, some Sending States have adopted 
legislation designed to motivate Destination States to bolster their own 
domestic law enforcement, victim prevention, and aid programs.246 Re-
sponding to Destination States’ need for financial assistance to combat 
CST-related activity, some Sending States have offered direct financial 
assistance aimed at reform.247 Given the historical link between weak 
law enforcement and CST in most Destination States, extending direct 
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financial assistance provides strong new incentives to tourism depend-
ant states. It also introduces an important element of accountability to 
states that commit their resources toward reform. 
 The most visible legislative effort to combat CST-related crimes 
through incentive-based programs is the recently augmented U.S. Vic-
tims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA).248  At 
the center of the TVPA’s incentive program is the Office to Monitor 
and Combat Trafficking, which publishes annual Trafficking in Per-
sons Reports (TIP Reports).249 TIP Reports compile and analyze in-
formation on global trafficking, and provide this data to the U.S. 
Congress, partner agencies and the NGO community.250 
 In addition to providing statistically significant data, TIP Reports 
act as both accountability mechanisms and catalysts for foreign gov-
ernments to combat global trafficking. They rate states based on gov-
ernment efforts to remedy trafficking251 and on compliance with the 
TVPA “minimum standard” guidelines.252 States are placed in tiers, 
which form the basis for various incentives and disincentives.253 For in-
centives, the TVPA offers assistance to states either directly or through 
international programs that provide aid to victims and high-risk popu-
lations.254 In 2002, the United States dedicated fifty-five million dollars 
to anti-trafficking programs in over fifty countries.255 In 2004, the 
United States provided ninety-six million dollars. TVPA disincentives 
include economic sanctions levied against the “worst offenders,” as well 
as the international stigmatization associated with having a poor hu-
man rights record.256 
 Upon the release of the first TIP Report, numerous governments 
took immediate steps to prevent trafficking, prosecute traffickers and 
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protect victims. Poorly-rated states increased their anti-trafficking ef-
forts to avoid economic sanctions and shed harmful stigma that 
threatened to impact their international trade, tourism, and aid.257 
Many of the worst offenders sought direct assistance from the United 
States to improve their TIP rating.258 Overall, the general trend was 
improved performance by states in subsequent TIP Reports.259 In 
those rare cases where third-tier states made no progress, the United 
States did in fact impose sanctions.260 
IV. A New International Initiative 
 To some extent, recent local efforts have improved CST enforce-
ment, increasing arrests and convictions. Despite these positive indica-
tors, however, CST offenses continue to increase and the bulk of of-
fenders continue to go unpunished,261 indicating that unilateral local 
efforts alone are inadequate. International bodies have mobilized 
against the escalation of CST offenses with collaborative efforts, includ-
ing treaties and agreements, that encourage member states to legislate 
aggressively against child sexual exploitation.262 The most recent at-
tempt to form a multi-state instrument addressing CST crimes is the 
COE Convention.263 
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A. Background 
 On May 22, 2005, a COE committee convened to assess the need 
for a new instrument addressing child sexual exploitation.264 Address-
ing the committee, COE Deputy Secretary-General Boer-Buquicchio 
stressed that existing international instruments were simply “not work-
ing.”265 Among the principal deficiencies she cited was the lack of “uni-
versal, legally-binding” documents specifically addressing child sexual 
exploitation.266 Relevant COE texts were similarly flawed: none were 
both legally-binding and sufficiently focused.267 
 Deputy Secretary-General Boer-Buquicchio urged a “move for-
ward,” contending that, in addition to being binding and focused, an 
optimally functioning instrument required “greater awareness, in-
creased cooperation and immediate action.”268 She added that critically 
important inter-state cooperation necessitated the establishment of 
“common standards and definitions,” harmonized criminal provisions 
across Europe, and state court jurisdiction over offenders irrespective 
of nationality or location.269 
 According to COE negotiators, harmonized legislation facilitates 
action against CST in several ways.270 First, it spoils perpetrators’ 
criminal preference for offending in Destination States that have le-
nient child protection laws.271 Second, shared laws yield comparable 
data that assists criminal research, as well as the exchange of informa-
tion and experience.272 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, har-
monization facilitates international cooperation in the form of extra-
dition and reciprocal legal assistance.273 
 Subsequent COE Committee deliberations resulted in the Conven-
tion, a collaborative response to deficiencies in member states’ child 
sexual exploitation protections. Even though the Convention is a re-
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gional document for COE Member States, it is open to outside signature 
and accession.274 The scope of the Convention spans both key Destina-
tion States in Eastern Europe and numerous Sending States of Western 
Europe.275 Consequently, the instrument addresses CST both domesti-
cally and abroad through a “comprehensive international instrument” 
which protects children, assists victims, and combats offenses.276 
B. Enforcement Measures 
 Arguably the Convention’s central effort, from a criminal law per-
spective, is the creation and enhancement of law enforcement meas-
ures that target sexually exploitative offenses. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
many of the Convention’s CST-related provisions incorporate compo-
nents of national CST legislation that have already been discussed. 
1. Jurisdiction 
 Because the Convention covers both Sending and Destination 
States, its law enforcement measures must address local as well as ET 
offenses. To this end, the Convention’s criminalization program en-
hances statutes against exploitative conduct domestically, while also 
mandating that member states establish ET jurisdiction over Convention 
offences committed abroad by nationals or “habitual resident[s].”277 
This latter requirement advances the position of those member states 
that are currently without CST-relevant ET legislation or that only have 
ET legislation covering nationals. 
 Additional provisions remove jurisdictional obstacles and extend 
states’ prosecutorial power. Notably, Articles 25(4) and 25(5) remove 
dual criminality and formal victim requests and state complaints as 
requirements of criminal prosecutions. 
2. Criminalization: Perpetrators, Offenses 
 As important as broadening ET jurisdiction is to the Conven-
tion’s law enforcement program, at the document’s heart are those 
provisions that criminalize exploitative acts. Under Article 19, child 
prostitution is defined as the use of a child for sexual activities where 
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money “or any other form of remuneration or consideration [is] . . . 
promised as payment.”278 Child prostitution offenses include recruit-
ing, causing, and coercing a child into prostitution as well as profiting 
from, otherwise exploiting, or having recourse to child prostitution.279 
Additionally, Article 24 criminalizes intentionally aiding, abetting, and 
attempting offenses linked to child prostitution.280 Finally, Article 20 
criminalizes production, possession, and distribution of child pornog-
raphy.281 Together, these provisions empower member states to pursue 
a wide range of CST offenses and perpetrators. Moreover, because 
Article 24 covers attempts, many of the legal benefits offered under 
the Act, such as pre-emptive enforcement, appear to be available. 
 Both traffickers and sex tour operators can be held criminally li-
able for causing, profiting from, or otherwise exploiting child prosti-
tutes, as well as for intentionally aiding and abetting related offences. 
These provisions have unique consequences for sex tour operators be-
cause Article 26 establishes administrative liability when persons inside 
a legal entity commit or “[make] possible” offenses on its behalf.282 By 
targeting the legal entity, the Convention threatens the driving force 
behind these operations: profitability.283 
 This is not to say that these criminalization provisions are without 
problems. The Convention does not define “sexual activities,” leaving 
member states to come up with their own interpretations.284 This in 
turn invites the defense that allegedly criminal conduct is not in fact 
covered under narrow statutory interpretations.285 While the term 
“sexual activities” looks sufficiently general, a “laundry list” approach, 
describing some examples of covered acts, would better support prose-
cution efforts. This approach was utilized in the UN Protocol to Pre-
vent, Suppress and Combat the Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children286 (UN Protocol) to define and criminalize hu-
man trafficking. Commentators on the UN Protocol credit this defini-
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tional specificity as the reason for more robust criminal statutes and 
enhanced national enforcement.287 
 Another problem with the Convention is that its focus on child 
prostitution involving commercial exchanges is limiting in light of the 
types of exploitation regularly occurring in informal sex markets. The 
Convention’s broad description of commercial exchanges invites a 
wider understanding of CST offenses, perhaps including some that are 
more indicative of the activity of informal markets. In situations, how-
ever, where patrons receive both sexual and non-sexual services which 
have not been specified or promised in advance, authorities saddled 
with the Convention’s definition may be unduly restrained and will ul-
timately have difficulty proving related offenses. 
 This shortcoming is significantly ameliorated by the Convention’s 
criminalization of “non-commercial” forms of child exploitation. Article 
18(1)(a) requires members to criminalize intentional sexual conduct 
with an underage child as defined by national law.288 This provision does 
not require that sexual conduct be overtly commercial. It does, however, 
allow member states to set their own ages of consent. This departure 
from the Convention’s overall harmonization program is unlikely to 
create the disastrous outcomes some critics have suggested.289 The re-
moval of dual criminality requirements weakens criminal preference 
among patrons who travel to states with low ages of consent and pre-
serves criminal liability. Further, Article 18(1)(b) criminalizes inten-
tional sexual conduct with any person under the age of eighteen, re-
gardless of state-endorsed ages of consent, when there is an abuse of 
influence over a child.290 Under the Convention, abuses of influence 
include situations exhibiting unequal economic or social standing that 
enable individuals to “control, punish, or reward,” children.291 This en-
compasses the majority of CST cases, including those occurring in in-
formal markets. 
3. Victims and Criminal Justice Procedures 
 In addition to establishing broad criminalization provisions, a 
group of Convention provisions make several adjustments to criminal 
justice procedures, with particular concern to how they affect CST vic-
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tims. These provisions track the progressive trends pursued by national 
legislation. Ultimately, however, Convention negotiators desired to 
minimize disparities between state procedural practices and transition 
beyond the standards set by previous national and international in-
struments. 
 Generally, member states are to be guided by the victims’ rights and 
“best interests” while implementing a “protective approach” that avoids 
aggravating victim trauma and incorporates state assistance to victims.292 
Notably, under Article 31, states are required to protect the rights and 
interests of victims, “including their special needs as witnesses.”293 A 
threshold issue addressed by this provision is the non-criminal status of 
child victims. By aligning children’s roles as witnesses with their victim 
rights, the victim’s utility as a mere witness is de-emphasized. 
 The Convention provides children, as both victims and witnesses, 
with specific protections designed to promote victim safety and com-
fort as well as witness cooperation.294 Article 31(a) requires states to 
inform victims of their rights and available services;295 this further as-
sures victims of their non-criminal status. Additionally, 31(b) requires 
that victims are informed when detained perpetrators are released, in 
order to minimize intimidation, retaliation, or re-victimization.296 
 Child-friendly proceedings are furthered by safeguards placed on 
the victim’s identity and privacy, so long as they comport with the fair 
trial procedures of the state.297 In particular, publication of the victim’s 
image and identifying information is prohibited, victim contact with 
perpetrators is minimized, and intermediaries—instead of victims— 
may address courts and present evidence.298 All information is pre-
sented in a “manner adapted to their age and maturity and in a lan-
guage that [victims] can understand.”299 Other provisions mandate that 
investigatory and judicial interviews be conducted on child-friendly 
premises, by specially trained personnel.300 Finally, victim trauma is re-
duced during trial by permitting both closed hearings and the use of 
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appropriate communication technologies for victim testimony and con-
frontation with the accused.301 
  Other key provisions also reduce victim trauma, enhance tes-
timony quality, and account for various time and cost considerations 
of proceedings. In particular, as seen in the Australian system, victim 
interviews are videotaped “where appropriate,” and accepted as evi-
dence.302 Similarly, CCTV and direct satellite feeds that offer real time 
witness testimony from remote locations are promoted.303 
 A final procedural adjustment eases statutory limitations on Con-
vention offenses. As noted, CST victims frequently lack the opportunity 
to identify offenders via formal channels. For this reason, the statute of 
limitations on offenses often expires before offenders are brought to 
justice. Seeking to address this problem, the Convention requires that 
the statute of limitations run within a “reasonable” time from the vic-
tim’s age of majority, not from the time of the offense.304 
4. Inter-Party Cooperation 
 Supporting the Convention’s criminalization and procedural pro-
visions are several measures bolstering international cooperation.305 
One prominent provision aims to accelerate “circulation of informa-
tion and evidence” in the areas of prevention, investigation, and prose-
cution, as well as victim protections and assistance. These efforts are 
designed, at least in part, to enhance the prosecutorial process, which 
will undoubtedly lead to lower costs and will improve the quality of evi-
dence. 
 The cooperative provision which most affects CST prosecutions is 
that which establishes the Convention as the legal basis for mutual legal 
assistance in criminal matters or extradition.306 When perpetrators flee 
across international boundaries, insufficient cooperation between 
states can stifle transnational criminal proceedings, adding significant 
cost and delay to the process.307 Mutual legal assistance agreements al-
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leviate such burdens on international investigations and prosecutions. 
Moreover, bureaucratic obstacles diminish as the frequent use of these 
instruments increases both the bonds between distinct state enforce-
ment mechanisms and the familiarity with foreign operational sys-
tems.308 Because COE members and the European Union (EU) are al-
ready party to instruments that operate as mutual legal assistance 
agreements,309 the impact here will be most pronounced for states out-
side the COE and EU who accede to the Convention under Article 
45.310 
 Finally, the Convention requires states “to endeavor to integrate” 
action programs aimed at assisting Destination States to combat Con-
vention offenses within their borders.311 If CST truly addressed, key 
Destination States must be integrated into international enforcement 
and prevention initiatives. Foreign assistance programs offer benefits to 
these Destination States by providing law enforcement training and re-
sources to apprehend perpetrators, as well as by supplementing victim 
assistance programs. Programs that provide additional occupational, 
educational, or informational assistance to at-risk children can also be 
used to tackle some of the root causes of CST. 
 A potential criticism is that the Convention’s provision concern-
ing these vital programs is merely permissive and not binding. How-
ever, it is difficult to imagine that any provision which requires mem-
bers to aid non-member states would garner collective agreement and 
necessary signatories. This is particularly true considering the long 
histories of corruption in many Destination States. 
 A more serious criticism is that the Convention provision fails to 
establish the possibility of rendering coordinated economic sanctions 
for states which perpetuate CST offenses. Because states have tradition-
ally tolerated and even indirectly promoted CST for financial gain, levy-
ing multilateral economic burdens on these same states could motivate 
a dramatic, curative response. Given the successful unilateral effort of 
the TVPA, a collaborative economic response would presumably yield 
even stronger results. With the proper financial motivators, Destination 
States may come to realize that their financial stake in CST is relatively 
small. Creating a financial cost for tolerating CST industry might 
prompt such states to finally crack down on CST, while retaining their 
“standard” sex tourism industry. 
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 There is some evidence that states may be willing to back orches-
trated economic sanctions to combat global criminal trends. One ex-
ample is “The Forty Recommendations” offered by the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF), which include coordinated countermeasures to pe-
nalize states that flout the FATF recommendations and harbor criminal 
behavior.312 The criminal trends addressed by the FATF have signifi-
cant, immediate economic consequences for coordinating states that 
might mitigate the economic backlash that could accompany economic 
sanctions, and help explain a sanctioning state’s willingness to coordi-
nate with others. Such economic considerations, however, are not nec-
essarily dispositive for states trying to determine whether or not to join 
such a coordinated effort. Ultimately, the FATF’s reliance on a multilat-
eral sanctions program shows that it is at least possible to achieve dra-
matic results from rogue states whose interest in criminal behavior is 
principally economic. This example holds out a beacon for change in 
states committed to curbing the global criminal trend of CST. 
C. Prevention 
 Several provisions of the Convention’s comprehensive program 
are aimed at preventing exploitation.313 Article 9 prompts states to en-
courage private-sector participation, particularly in the tourism and 
technology industries, in information campaigns designed to raise 
awareness about exploitation among travelers and communities with at-
risk child populations.314 
 Information campaigns are often championed as vital anti-CST 
measures because they address serious information deficiencies that 
perpetuate offenses.315 As trafficked persons lack sufficient knowledge 
of immigration procedures, they are susceptible to a trafficker’s false 
advertisements for work abroad. The information deficit among child 
victims is especially problematic. Additionally, new evidence confirms 
that CST perpetrators increasingly exploit newly available technologies, 
such as text messaging and the Internet, to facilitate offenses.316 Such 
technologies provide new distribution avenues for recruitment adver-
tisements.317 Arguably, the Convention’s promise of raising awareness 
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of CST among Internet service providers and adjusting industry norms 
is responsive to such technologically informed exploitation techniques. 
 There is evidence, moreover, that tourists fail to understand the 
exploitative conditions of CST and assume their patronage principally 
benefits the prostituted child.318 Tourists may also be unaware of the 
consequences of committing offenses in foreign states where child 
prostitution appears culturally acceptable. Such misunderstandings 
may contribute to the CST offenses, especially among opportunistic 
patrons. Information campaigns within the tourism industry highlight-
ing the exploitative conditions of child prostitution, as well as health 
and legal risks associated with CST offenses, may act as effective deter-
rents for some offenders. Given their COE membership, Eastern Euro-
pean states in particular stand to benefit from these industry-based pro-
grams. To date, several states have teamed with the tourist sector to 
implement information campaigns, which appear to have achieved 
stricter criminal enforcement.319 
 Article 8(2) prohibits the dissemination of materials advertising 
services which would be an offense under the Convention.320 Which 
materials are prohibited by this measure, however, remains unclear. 
Arguably, advertisements published by sex tour operators would be 
covered, as they are in New Zealand.321 While successfully prohibiting 
such materials may dampen the industry and make child sex less ac-
cessible to perpetrators, problems will inevitably persist. As Conven-
tion drafters suggest, these prohibitions may encounter difficulties 
with freedoms of information and speech in several European nations 
protected under the ECHR, so the positive impact of this provision is 
uncertain.322 It should also be noted that while information cam-
paigns are vital, they can offer governments a merely cosmetic solu-
tion to CST.323 Making a show of compliance, states can ignore reme-
dies that address more systemic causes.324 
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D. Victim Assistance 
 Under the Convention, victim assistance provisions aim to estab-
lish “social programs” and “multidisciplinary structures” to support 
victims and their directly affected caregivers.325 The Convention estab-
lishes both short and long-term programs for “physical and psycho-
social recovery.”326 Doing so positively impacts victims’ performance 
as witnesses. Long-term recovery initiatives respond forcefully to per-
sistent criticisms of earlier instruments that victim care improperly 
focused on immediate rescue care and the victim’s performance as a 
witness.327 Convention negotiators note that protracted trauma may 
require long-term care, which also comports with the Convention’s 
goal of integrating victims back into society. 328 
 Along these lines, the Convention stands out in addressing psy-
chological scars that accompany the sexual victimization of children 
and impede social reintegration.329 Victim rehabilitation is further 
advanced by commitment to the family unit, particularly by prescrib-
ing “therapeutic assistance” for persons close to the victim.330 Invest-
ing in the family unit as a primary instrument for long-term victim 
rehabilitation is an innovative step forward for this type of legislation. 
 While these state assistance programs appear ambitious, the Con-
vention alleviates some burden by requiring members to collaborate 
with victim aid organizations, particularly NGOs, to meet program 
goals.331 Historically, NGOs have played a major role in the rehabilita-
tion stage of child victims of sexual exploitation. Earnest collaborative 
efforts between states and NGOs will enhance the effectiveness of 
state assistance measures. 
 Despite its innovative program for victim assistance, the Conven-
tion is less directive than desirable when it comes to naming specific 
social and health services obligations of states. For example, negotiators 
note that state obligations for victim recovery could include medical 
screening and treatment concerning STD and HIV infection.332 The 
lack of requirements by the Convention regarding which health and 
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social services states should pursue may allow states to evade taking 
more substantive steps toward victim recovery and rehabilitation. A ma-
jor failure of the Convention, unlike other prior instruments, is that it 
fails to contemplate other basic victim needs, such as housing, food, 
and education—a glaring omission, given the economic deprivation 
that so commonly leads to child exploitation.333 
Conclusion 
 Now that CST has attracted global attention, it frequently appears 
on the domestic and foreign policy agendas of national legislatures. 
Despite these signs of progress, CST offenses continue to escalate. To 
combat this, multinational approaches that synchronize various states’ 
legislation are needed. 
 The Convention is currently the best standard. Its comprehensive 
program incorporates some of the best practices of both Sending and 
Destination States, and adds new, innovative enforcement and assis-
tance provisions. Ultimately, participating states are moved toward 
robust action and greater legal homogenization while still enjoying a 
fair margin of leeway to realize their commitments. 
 Perhaps the greatest limitation of the Convention with respect to 
CST is the fact that, despite being open for outside ratification, its 
membership is unlikely to include many of the popular Destination 
States outside Europe. Because the ability of Sending States to detect, 
investigate, and prosecute CST offenders is limited even under the best 
circumstances, gaining serious involvement from all Destination States 
is vital to curbing the current escalation of CST. 
 For this reason, failing to adopt measures that would unite Con-
vention members into a formidable economic bloc that could levy 
steep sanctions against states persistently tolerant of CST was a serious 
oversight. Future multi-national instruments should either secure the 
membership of all Destination States, or adopt provisions to coordi-
nate economic sanctions against the remaining outliers. 
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